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Introduction

How the Medicate-toExecute Scheme
Undermines Individual
Liberty, Offends Societal
Norms, and Violates
The Constitution
“The blind think I’m playing a game.
They deny me, refusing my existence,
but everybody takes the place of
another. I will come forth as you go.”1

As of January 2013, there are
a total of 3,125 inmates on death
row in the United States.2 And
while it is difficult to obtain
accurate statistics, it is estimated
that five to ten percent of all
inmates on death row suffer
from mental illness.3 In 1986, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in
Ford v. Wainwright, that it is
unconstitutional to execute the
insane.4 Put succinctly, “[t]here is
something unseemly about
sending a person who is floridly
psychotic to his death, when he
has no knowledge of what is
coming.”5 What about the
severely mentally ill individual
whose symptoms do not, at the
moment of the competency
determination, indicate that the
individual is “floridly psychotic”?
The American Psychiatric
Association, the American
Psychological Association, the
National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, and the American
Bar Association share the opinion that inmates with severe
mental illness, even those who
are not “floridly psychotic,”
should not be executed.6 The
symptoms of mental illness often
fluctuate in response to environmental stressors and “triggers,” as
well as in response to treatment;
for example, the symptoms of an
© ingimage
individual’s schizophrenia may
go from being severe and obvious to hardly noticeable.7
Thus, someone showing symptoms of severe mental illness may be deemed incompetent one day and then competent as soon as the symptoms have dissipated. It is for
this reason that the American Bar Association has recommended that an inmate found incompetent for execution
should automatically receive a lesser punishment, rather
than allowing the inmate to be executed if and when competency is restored.8 Yet states wishing to continue executing mentally ill inmates have used the reality that symptoms of severe mental illness wax and wane in order to
develop a creative way around the restriction imposed by
Ford: forcing a mentally ill death row inmate to take
antipsychotic drugs, with the hope that the medication
will restore the inmate to the level of competency required
for a constitutional execution.
This article sets forth two arguments why states
should be prohibited from forcibly medicating mentally
ill inmates in order to achieve competency for execution.
First, the state does not have an important governmental
interest in executing an individual who cannot be constitutionally executed. Second, such forcible medication

BY C A I T L I N S T E I N K E

26

W W W. N A C D L . O R G

THE CHAMPION

The State’s Interest in
Forcibly Medicating
Inmates and Criminal
Defendants
For someone suffering from mental
illness, antipsychotic drugs have the
potential to alleviate psychosis and
allow the individual to regain normal
functioning.9 However, such intense
medication can also have serious side
effects, such as tardive dyskinesia and
type 2 diabetes.10 It is thus understandable why there is resistance to allowing
the state to forcibly medicate mentally
ill individuals any time it would benefit
the state. Nonetheless, exceptions have
been made in the context of the criminal justice system, in which the role of
the state is unique. This section examines two situations in which the state
has been deemed to have a legitimate
interest in forcibly medicating a mentally ill individual: when the individual is
an inmate and when the individual faces
criminal charges and is to stand trial.

A. An Inmate’s (Limited) Right
To Refuse Medication
The Bureau of Justice Statistics
reported in 2006 that more than half of
all men and women housed in
America’s prison systems had a mental
health problem.11 The number is so
high that the three largest inpatient
psychiatric facilities in the country are
prisons, not treatment centers or hospitals.12 In fact, seriously mentally ill individuals in jails and prisons outnumber
those in hospitals three to one.13 Besides
shining light on the increasingly common criminalization — rather than
W W W. N A C D L . O R G

treatment — of mental illness, these
staggering statistics raise the very real
dilemma of how the prison system
should confront its responsibility to
take care of sick inmates. Inmates have
a right to medically necessary care, and
prison physicians have a legal and ethical duty to provide such care, which
includes psychiatric treatment.14 The
U.S. Supreme Court has even held that
the deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s medical needs violates the
Eighth Amendment.15 But when the
most effective form of treatment available is the administration of antipsychotic drugs, both substantive and procedural due process are certainly implicated. Thus, a state must reconcile its
obligation to effectively care for the
inmates over whom it has custody and
control with its duty not to unnecessarily intrude on the personal autonomy of
those same inmates.
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court
was faced with balancing these competing concerns in Washington v. Harper,
which presented the scenario of a state
forcibly medicating a mentally ill
inmate.16 After the inmate refused to
take antipsychotic drugs, a committee
developed to address such situations
determined that the prison could
forcibly administer the medication.17
Walter Harper’s appeal reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, and a fundamental
component of the Court’s opinion was
the holding that individuals have a “significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs.”18 However, instead of ruling that the state could not forcibly
medicate Harper unless he was first
found to be incompetent to make his
own medical decisions — the position
advanced by Harper — the Court held
that the liberty interest at stake must be
analyzed within the context of Harper’s
imprisonment.19
The policy of the state of
Washington only allowed the forcible
medication of a mentally ill inmate if
there was first a medical finding of a
mental disorder that is likely to cause
harm if untreated; then, the medication
had to be prescribed by a psychiatrist
and approved by a reviewing psychiatrist.20 The Court held that this system
satisfied procedural due process
because it ensured that antipsychotic
drugs would only be forcibly administered when it was in the prisoner’s medical interests as well as the interests of
the state in maintaining a secure prison
environment.21 And because of the
inherently medical nature of the signif-

icant liberty interest, the Court held
that it might be more appropriate for a
medical professional, rather than a
judge, to make the final decision of
whether to forcibly medicate the mentally ill inmate.22
Ultimately, the Court held that a
state can administer antipsychotic drugs
against the will of an inmate only when
(1) the inmate poses a danger to himself
or others and (2) the medication is in
the inmate’s medical interests.23 But as
the Court stressed in its decision, it
framed its legal analysis solely within
the realities of the prison context.

B. Forcibly Medicating a
Defendant in Order to
Achieve Competency
To Stand Trial
The U.S. Supreme Court held in
Dusky v. United States that a defendant
is not competent to stand trial unless he
has both a “sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding” and “a
rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.”24 Thus,
the standard for competency to stand
trial includes both an assistance element
and a cognitive element. And with more
than 20 percent of criminal defendants
suffering from mental illness,25 meeting
the Dusky standard becomes relevant for
thousands of people in the criminal justice system.
Two years after Harper was decided,
the Court heard Riggins v. Nevada, a
case in which a criminal defendant, who
wanted to show the jury his “true mental
state,” filed a motion to cease taking his
antipsychotic medication until the end
of his trial.26 After being charged with
murder, David Riggins complained of
suffering from auditory hallucinations
and an inability to sleep, so the prison
psychiatrist decided to treat Riggins with
antipsychotic drugs.27 After courtappointed psychiatrists evaluated the
medicated Riggins, the judge found him
competent to stand trial; Riggins then
requested a court order suspending the
administration of his antipsychotic
medication until after the trial had
ended.28 He argued that the medication’s
effects on his mental state and demeanor
during his trial violated due process
because it denied him the opportunity
to show the jury his “true” mental state.29
The trial court denied Riggins’ request,
instead continuing to forcibly administer the antipsychotic medication until
the completion of his trial.30
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
was confronted with how to apply its
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violates the Eighth Amendment because
it is left purely to chance whether
antipsychotic medication will restore a
mentally ill inmate to competency.
In order to place the involuntary
medication of death row inmates within
the larger context of forcibly medicating
mentally ill individuals, this article
begins by addressing the state’s interest
in forcibly medicating inmates and
criminal defendants, as well as the legal
standards that must be met in order to
do so. It then examines the U.S. Supreme
Court’s prohibition on the execution of
the insane, and the competency standard
that has developed as a result. This article then presents two arguments that
defense counsel should make when the
state wishes to forcibly medicate a mentally ill death row inmate in order to
restore competency for execution.
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ruling from Harper to the situation presented by Riggins. The Court began by
reaffirming the principle that “[t]he
forcible injection of medication into a
nonconsenting person’s body represents
a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”31 It then held that the same
factors that allow for the forcible medication of an inmate must exist in order
to justify the forcible medication of a
defendant; therefore, after Riggins filed
his motion, the state had the duty to
demonstrate that the continued use of
the antipsychotic medication was both
necessary and medically appropriate.32
What is striking, however, is that while
Harper held that it was necessary for a
state to establish that an unmedicated
inmate was dangerous to himself or others, the Court’s decision in Riggins made
no mention of a requisite finding of
dangerousness before the state can
forcibly medicate a mentally ill defendant.33 Thus, instead of having to meet
the two-prong test laid out in Harper,
the state could simply have shown that it
would not have been possible to determine Riggins’ guilt or innocence
through the use of less intrusive means.34
In 2003, the Court had the opportunity to clarify whether a state wishing
to forcibly medicate a mentally ill
defendant in order to restore competency to stand trial had to first establish
that the unmedicated defendant was a
danger to himself or others.35 The case,
Sell v. United States, involved a mentally ill criminal defendant being tried for
multiple counts of insurance fraud, a
nonviolent crime. 36 Following the
indictment, however, Charles Sell’s
mental health deteriorated, and he
began to experience more psychotic
episodes involving hallucinations and
paranoia; Sell made several statements
to his treating psychiatrist that suggested that Sell might harm FBI agents, and
he was subsequently indicted with
attempted murder.37 After the two cases
were joined, the trial judge determined
that Sell was not competent to stand
trial, and ordered that Sell be hospitalized for four months and then re-evaluated.38 Sell then refused to take the
antipsychotic medication recommended by the hospital staff, raising the
question of whether the state could
forcibly medicate Sell in order to try
and restore him to competency to stand
trial.39
The Court’s analysis in Sell culminated in a four-prong test to determine
whether the state may forcibly administer medication in order to restore a
criminal defendant to competency: (1)
W W W. N A C D L . O R G

there must be important governmental
interests at stake, (2) involuntary medication must significantly further those
interests, (3) involuntary medication
must be necessary to further those interests, and (4) the medication must be
medically appropriate.40 The Court
pointed out that the state certainly has
an important interest in bringing the
accused to trial and ensuring that all trials are fair,41 and defined “medically
appropriate” as “the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”42 And most importantly, the
Court’s holding in Sell made it clear that
a finding of dangerousness is not
required.

Achieving Competency
To Be Executed
While the U.S. Supreme Court has
yet to hold that it is unconstitutional to
execute mentally ill individuals, its decision in Ford v. Wainwright did prohibit
the execution of insane inmates as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.43 Since
then, the Court has been refining the
competency standard that must be met
in order for an insane inmate to be
exempt from execution. This section
addresses that evolving standard, and
then examines the three major court
decisions that have analyzed the permissibility of forcibly medicating mentally
ill inmates in order to achieve competency for execution.

A. Searching for a
Clear Standard
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Court
articulated several possible justifications
for the prohibition on executing the
insane: executing an insane person
offends humanity; the punishment has
no deterrence value or retributive value; it
is “uncharitable” to send an individual
into the afterlife when that individual
does not have the capacity to prepare for
such a transition; and insanity is its own
punishment.44 Without relying on any
particular justification, the Court determined that states must have adequate
procedures in place that will protect the
constitutional right of insane inmates not
to be executed. However, the Court did
not clearly define how a state should
determine competency for execution;
instead, the plurality left behind a rather
vague and cryptic ruling: the state cannot
constitutionally execute an inmate
“whose mental illness prevents him from
comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications.”45 Since this opinion
essentially left it to the states to create

their own specific standards for competency, lower courts have turned to Justice
Powell’s concurrence for guidance.
In his concurring opinion, Justice
Powell articulated a more narrow holding, stating that the Eighth Amendment
only forbids executing “those who are
unaware of the punishment they are
about to suffer and why they are to suffer
it.”46 So while the standard for competency to stand trial includes both an assistance element and a cognitive element,47
Justice Powell’s test only measures the
cognitive ability to understand the punishment and why it is being carried out.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently
revisited this standard in 2007, in
Panetti v. Quarterman.48 Scott Panetti
claimed that the Fifth Circuit had misapplied Ford in holding that a death
row inmate is competent to be executed
when the inmate is aware (1) that he is
going to be executed and (2) why he is
going to be executed.49 At first blush,
this standard appears to be in line with
that articulated by Justice Powell.
However, as the Supreme Court emphasized, this standard would allow for the
execution of a mentally ill inmate who
is aware that he is being executed for
murder, but whose mental illness renders him unable to appreciate the connection between his crime and his execution. In other words, the Fifth
Circuit’s standard “treats a prisoner’s
delusional belief system as irrelevant if
the prisoner knows that the state has
identified his crimes as the reason for
his execution.”50
This ruling only muddied the
waters with respect to a clear competency standard. For example, an inmate can
be Ford-competent by knowing that he
is to be executed and knowing the reason for it, but may not necessarily also
be Panetti-competent if the inmate’s
delusions interfere with his ability to
rationally appreciate his situation.51 One
of the problems with the Panetti decision is that the Court did not explain
what is required to have a “rational
understanding.”52 Nonetheless, it is significant that the Court expressed an
understanding that an inmate who suffers from delusional beliefs can be aware
of the state’s rationale for execution
while still lacking the requisite rational
understanding.53

B. Rulings Addressing Forcible
Medication to Achieve
Competency for Execution
While the U.S. Supreme Court has
yet to address whether a state can
forcibly medicate a prisoner in order to
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achieve competency for execution, two
state supreme courts and the Eight
Circuit have confronted this issue and
have reached different outcomes.
i. Louisiana Supreme Court
In 1992, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that forcibly medicating a
death row inmate in order to achieve
competency for execution violated the
Louisiana Constitution. 54 The court
noted that without medication, the
inmate was “incurably insane and
incompetent for execution,” yet was
“sometimes … able to function at a
minimum level of rationality” when he
was being treated with antipsychotic
drugs.55 In evaluating the legal arguments before it, the court made several
determinations. The court stressed that
forcibly medicating a mentally ill
inmate, and then executing him while
he was still under the influence of the
drugs that had restored his competency, was a direct circumvention of the
long-recognized prohibition on executing insane inmates.56 Additionally,
the court held that forcing a mentally
ill inmate to ingest antipsychotic drugs
cannot possibly be in the inmate’s best
medical interest because medicating to
restore competency for execution is not
a form of medical treatment.57
The court also viewed this type of
forcible medication as impermissible
punishment, rather than medical treatment that meets the Harper standard
by serving the inmate’s medical interests as well as the state’s interests in
maintaining safety. 58 The Louisiana
Supreme Court stayed the inmate’s
execution, and held that the state could
only apply for a modification of the
stay of execution if the inmate
“achieves or regains his sanity independently of and without the influence
of antipsychotic drugs.”59
ii. South Carolina
Supreme Court
One year later, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that forcibly medicating an inmate solely to facilitate
execution violates the South Carolina
Constitution.60 The court noted that
experts had testified that the inmate’s
brain was so damaged that not only
would it be highly unlikely that
antipsychotic medication would
restore him to competency, but he
would likely experience harmful side
effects as a result of the forced treatment.61 After analyzing the holdings
from Harper , Riggins , and the
Louisiana Supreme Court case, the
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South Carolina Supreme Court held
that “justice can never be served by
forcing medication on an incompetent
inmate for the sole purpose of getting
him well enough to execute.”62 The
court held that the violation of the
inmate’s right to remain free from
unwanted medical treatment cannot be
justified simply by the broad penological interest of the state, and that the
state must still satisfy the two-prong
test established by Harper: the inmate
must pose a danger to himself or others
and the medication must be in the
inmate’s best medical interest.63
iii. Eighth Circuit
In 2003, the Eighth Circuit
addressed the “medicate-to-execute”
scheme in Singleton v. Norris, which
involved an inmate suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia.64 Three years
before Charles Singleton’s execution
was scheduled, Arkansas placed him on
an involuntary medication regime after
determining that he met the two-prong
test established by Harper.65 Yet once an
execution date was set, Singleton
claimed that the state was barred from
forcibly medicating him to render him
competent for execution.66 The essence
of Singleton’s argument was that treatment with antipsychotic medication is
no longer in the inmate’s medical interests when execution looms.67
Nonetheless, the Eight Circuit
emphasized that the state interests
must still be considered, and that the
state certainly has an interest in carrying
out
lawfully
imposed
punishments.68 The court then weighed
the state’s interests against those of
Singleton, and found that the state’s
interests were stronger, since not only
had Singleton expressed a preference in
being medicated rather than in a psychotic state, but because the medication had caused no substantial side
effects.69 Ultimately, the court held that
antipsychotic drugs were medically
necessary to alleviate Singleton’s psychosis and that there was no less intrusive medical treatment through which
the state could restore Singleton to
competency.70 According to the Eighth
Circuit, even though Singleton claimed
that continuing to be forcibly medicated was not in his medical interests, the
reality was that it was the eligibility for
execution — and not any medical consequence of the antipsychotic drugs —
that Singleton wished to avoid.71 The
U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear
the case,72 and Singleton was executed
on Jan. 6, 2004.73

The Failings of the
Medicate-toExecute Scheme
States should not be allowed to
forcibly medicate mentally ill death
row inmates in order to achieve competency for execution for two reasons.
First, the state does not have an important governmental interest in executing
an individual who cannot be constitutionally executed. Second, the medicate-to-execute scheme violates the
Eighth Amendment because it is completely arbitrary, since not all mentally
ill individuals can be restored to competency through forced medication.

A. The Lack of an Important
State Interest
Because forcing an inmate to ingest
antipsychotic drugs violates a significant liberty interest, the Harper Court
required that the state first show that
(1) the inmate poses a danger to himself or others and (2) the medication is
in the inmate’s medical interests.74 The
Court made it clear that its decision
reflected the balance of the state’s and
the inmate’s interests within the context
of a prison, and that the state has an
interest in maintaining a safe prison
environment.75 However, the Court
subsequently removed the dangerousness requirement in the context of
restoring a defendant’s competency to
stand trial, instead holding that the
state has an important interest in bringing the accused to trial and ensuring
that all trials are fair.76 This article does
not argue that forcibly medicating a
death row inmate must be predicated
upon a finding of dangerousness.77 Even
without applying the strict test from
Harper to the medicate-to-execute scenario, and instead applying the much
more state-friendly test from Sell, the
state still cannot meet its burden.
As the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Sell, the state may only forcibly medicate a mentally ill criminal defendant
if the state first demonstrates that it has
an important governmental interest in
doing so.78 The state can meet this burden by showing that it has an important governmental interest in bringing
the accused to trial and ensuring that
the defendant’s trial is fair.79 However,
there is no similar interest at stake
when a state is seeking to forcibly medicate a mentally ill inmate in order to
restore competency for execution.
Some argue that prohibiting states
from executing inmates made competent through involuntary medication
THE CHAMPION
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Once again, the Court’s ruling in
Atkins does not exempt the mentally
retarded from criminal liability, as it
remains perfectly acceptable to try and
convict such individuals for murder.
Instead, the Court simply emphasized
the essential proportionality between the
severity of the criminal sanction and the
culpability of the offender. This clearly
signifies that while the state continues to
have an important interest in ensuring
that even the mentally retarded are held
accountable for the ways in which they
harm society, any similar government
interest in executing mentally retarded
inmates is trumped by “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.”89
While mental retardation generally
manifests at or near birth, mental illness
usually does not develop until early
adulthood or later.90 It might seem that
the death penalty exemption for mentally retarded inmates is based on the
recognition that their underlying crimes
were committed under the influence of
mental retardation, a justification that
would not apply to an inmate who only
became mentally ill subsequent to his
crime and conviction. However, the
death row prisoner at issue in Ford v.
Wainwright, the landmark case that
prohibited the execution of the insane,

did not begin to show signs of his mental illness until eight years after being
sentenced to death.91 Therefore, the justification behind prohibiting his execution had nothing to do with his culpability at the time of his crime, or his
mental state at the time of his trial and
sentencing. Instead, the Court focused
solely on his mental capacity at the time
at which he was due to be executed, and
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing the insane, “[w]hether
its aim be to protect the condemned
from fear and pain without comfort of
understanding, or to protect the dignity
of society itself from the barbarity of
exacting mindless vengeance.”92
The state does not have an important governmental interest in executing
mentally retarded prisoners. Even if
doctors developed medication that
could temporarily increase someone’s
cognitive functioning, the state could
not force a mentally retarded death row
inmate to ingest the medication in
order to lawfully execute the inmate
because it has no important governmental interest in executing someone
that the Constitution forbids the state
from executing. Likewise, the prohibition on executing the insane must not
be circumvented by forcibly medicating
mentally ill prisoners in order to restore
AUGUST 2013
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would undermine the state’s ability to
ensure that lawfully imposed punishment is being carried out.80 Yet when
the mentally ill prisoner does not have
the competency required for a constitutional execution, it does not matter
whether the sentence of death was lawful — the execution of someone who is
incompetent is not lawful. And the
state certainly does not have an important governmental interest in executing
an individual that the Constitution forbids the state from executing. It is helpful to analogize to the way in which the
U.S. Supreme Court has viewed the
constitutional constraints on the treatment of mentally retarded criminals.
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court
held, in Atkins v. Virginia, that executing mentally retarded prisoners violates
the Eighth Amendment.81 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court emphasized
the inherently mitigating nature of
mental retardation; because intellectual
disability diminishes the individual’s
capacity to engage in logical decisionmaking, the individual is prone to
engage in impulsive behavior that
ignores past experiences and consequences.82 Thus, while such deficiencies
do not excuse criminal behavior, the
criminal sanctions imposed must be
proportional to the inmate’s personal
culpability.83 The Court ruled that mentally retarded inmates must be exempt
from execution for two reasons.
First, neither retribution nor deterrence is achieved by executing such individuals.84 Retribution represents society’s
interest in ensuring that those who commit crimes are punished, yet the severity
of the punishment must be in proportion to the culpability of the criminal.
And since the death penalty is a sanction
reserved for only the most culpable criminals, individuals whose personal culpability is necessarily diminished by intellectual disability must be exempt from
such a sanction.85 Similarly, a criminal
sanction as severe as the death penalty
can only serve to deter those who would
otherwise deliberately plan to commit
murder; since mental retardation
inhibits impulse control, any deterrent
value of the death penalty is lost on an
individual who makes decisions based on
impulse rather than premeditation.86
Second, the reduced capacity of mentally
retarded individuals renders them less
likely to be able to assist in their own
defense.87 Intellectual disability makes it
far more difficult for the defendant to
communicate with his or her attorney, to
testify as a witness, and to even appear to
the jury as a remorseful person.88
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competency for execution. By the time
the mentally ill inmate is on death row,
the state has already achieved its interest in bringing a criminal case against
the defendant and garnering the support of the judge or jury. The state has
already satisfied its goal of carrying out
lawful justice for the community, whose
members feel wronged by criminal
behavior and want to see the criminal
punished. But the state’s interest does
not extend as far as to force a mentally
ill prisoner to ingest antipsychotic
drugs in the hopes that the medication
will restore competency and allow the
state to execute the prisoner.
It is important to note that the
state could still achieve its interest in
carrying out justice by changing the
inmate’s sentence to life without the
possibility of parole, which would also
allow the inmate to pursue voluntary
treatment without triggering his execution.93 The change in sentence could be
permanent or temporary. For example,
the state could grant the inmate a permanent stay of execution, or it could
implement the rule from the Louisiana
Supreme Court and refrain from executing the inmate until the inmate is
restored to competency without the aid
of antipsychotic medication.94
W W W. N A C D L . O R G

B. Effective Antipsychotic
Medication as a
Lightning Bolt
Antipsychotic medication does
not always work. A recent study shows
that antipsychotic drugs do help many
people suffering from schizophrenia,
and can decrease the risk of relapse by
60 percent.95 Yet the effectiveness of
such medication depends entirely on
the individual, and there is no cure for
schizophrenia.96 Therefore, the state’s
ability to execute a mentally ill inmate
relies solely on whether the antipsychotic medication does, in fact, restore
the individual to competency. The execution of a mentally ill inmate whose
competency has been restored through
forcible medication thus becomes
“cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual.”97
Singleton was executed by the state
of Arkansas simply because his medication was able to restore him to the
level of competency required for a constitutional execution.98 The antipsychotic drugs forced upon him by the
state restored his ability to understand
that he was to be executed and why that
was his fate, even though Singleton was
only able to understand this when he
was being forcibly medicated.99 Even
while he was on his medication for
schizophrenia, Singleton continued to
hear voices, some of which talked
about killing him.100 Singleton’s schizophrenia was severe, and by the late
1980s — on the heels of the Court’s
decision in Ford — it was clear that he
did not possess a rational understanding of his execution; Singleton
expressed the belief that his execution
would simply stop his breathing, but
that the judge could then start his
breathing again. 101 He was taking
antipsychotic medication by the early
1990s, but any time his medication was
increased or changed, or when
Singleton failed to take his medication,
his symptoms would worsen. 102
Arkansas then put Singleton on an
involuntary medication regimen,103 and
executed him while he was under the
influence of the drugs.104
Judge Heaney wrote a vigorous
dissent in Singleton’s case, in which he
explained his disbelief with the majority’s ability to justify the state’s medicate-to-execute scheme:
Based on the medical history in
this case, I am left with no
alternative but to conclude that
drug-induced sanity is not the

same as true sanity. Singleton is
not “cured”; his insanity is
merely muted, at times, by the
powerful drugs he is forced to
take. Underneath this mask of
stability, he remains insane.
Ford’s prohibition on executing the insane should apply
with no less force to Singleton
than to untreated prisoners.105
Why is being executed after
responding positively to involuntary
antipsychotic medication like being
struck by lightning? Consider the following scenario. Two co-defendants,
both of whom suffer from severe schizophrenia, are convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. Both are found
incompetent to be executed in their current mental state. The state secures permission to forcibly medicate both prisoners in hopes of restoring them to
competency for execution. Only one of
the prisoners responds positively to the
medication; the other continues to suffer from paranoia and auditory hallucinations, and has no rational understanding of his pending execution.
Despite the state’s attempt to restore the
second prisoner to competency through
the use of various antipsychotic drugs,
the prisoner remains incompetent and
continues to deteriorate. Therefore, the
state can only execute the first prisoner
— whose competency has been restored
through forcible medication — and not
the second prisoner, who remains unresponsive to forcible medication.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in
Furman v. Georgia, placed a temporary
moratorium on the death penalty systems across the country after finding
that Georgia’s legal procedure for sentencing defendants to death was cruel
and unusual because it allowed for
prejudice and discrimination to determine the fate of people who faced the
death penalty.106 If it is arbitrary for one
co-defendant to be sentenced to death
because he is Black or poor, but for the
other co-defendant to be spared such a
sentence because he is White or rich,
surely it is just as arbitrary and unfair
to allow the execution of a mentally ill
prisoner simply because the antipsychotic medication forced upon him by
the state happened to ease his suffering
and restore him to competency.
Because there can be no guarantee
that any mentally ill death row inmate
can be restored to competency through
the administration of antipsychotic
drugs, states must not be allowed to
forcibly medicate mentally ill inmates in
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order to restore competency for execution. To otherwise allow such an option
permits states to operate a legal process
that imposes death upon inmates in a
way that is completely arbitrary and
violates the Constitution’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishment.

Conclusion
Mental illness is a brain disease. It
is not a choice, a reflection of poor
moral judgment or bad character, and
it is often unpleasant. Society has
already determined that while mental
illness does not necessarily excuse bad
behavior — especially criminal behavior that causes harm to others — it can
decrease one’s culpability. Additionally,
society frowns upon taking the life of
someone whose mental defects are so
serious as to prevent that person from
recognizing the harm he has done to
others and the punishment he faces as
a result. States must not be allowed to
circumvent the prohibition on executing the insane by forcing ill prisoners
to ingest medication that makes it possible for those who suffer from grave
diseases of the mind to temporarily
W W W. N A C D L . O R G

regain healthy brain functioning. Not
only does the state have a weak interest
in doing so, but it is not guaranteed
that every forcibly medicated inmate
will be restored to competency.
The tragic irony is that only individuals whose bodies respond positively to
the antipsychotic drugs — which were
developed to ease the pain and suffering
of mental illness — will be executed by
the state. This does not serve society’s
interests. Instead, it interferes with a fundamental liberty interest of the inmate,
and it delivers state-sanctioned death in
a way that violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. As Judge Heaney
wrote in his dissent to the Eighth
Circuit’s decision to allow Arkansas to
execute Singleton, “I believe that to execute a man who is severely deranged
without treatment, and arguably incompetent when treated, is the pinnacle of
what Justice Marshall called ‘the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.’”107
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